Arctic Petroleum and the 2°C Goal : A Case for Accountability for Fossil-Fuel Supply by Shapovalova, Daria
Arctic Petroleum and the 2°C Goal: a Case for 
Accountability for Fossil-Fuel Supply
Daria Shapovalova 
University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
dshapovalova @abdn.ac.uk
Abstract
The Arctic is both a place disproportionately affected by climate change and a place 
that has been, and continues to be, subject to large-scale oil-and-gas development. 
Production and subsequent combustion of these resources would compromise the 
treaty-established target of keeping global warming ‘well below’ 2°C. The global 
regulatory efforts on climate change are centred on greenhouse gas emissions from 
fossil-fuel consumption, almost ignoring the supply side. In the absence of universal 
and strict emission-reduction targets, petroleum exports and carbon leakage jeopardize 
the effectiveness of the climate change regime. Through the examination of treaties 
and national practice, this paper argues for the establishment of accountability for the 
production of Arctic petroleum in light of climate change.
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1 Introduction
The ipcc’s Fifth Assessment Report stated that the ‘the estimate of the total 
fossil fuel reserves and resources1 contains sufficient carbon to yield, if released, 
1 The ipcc distinguished reserves and resources in that ‘reserves are those quantities able to 
be recovered under existing economic and operating conditions; resources are those where 
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radiative forcing above that required to limit global mean temperature change 
to less than 2°C.’2 In order to meet climate goals, a third of the oil reserves and 
half of the gas reserves must remain unused.3 In particular, the development 
of Arctic fossil-fuel resources is ‘incommensurate with efforts to limit average 
global warming to 2°C.’4 The US Geological Survey estimates that around 22 
per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources are located in the 
Arctic, with about 85 per cent lying offshore.5 This has been confirmed by a 
number of large offshore discoveries in the last decade, including large oil-and-
gas fields in Norway, Russia, and the United States.6
In January 2020, the Norwegian Court of Appeal confirmed that the 
Norwegian government did not violate the right to a healthy environment or 
its international climate obligations when it awarded petroleum production 
licenses in the Barents Sea.7 This article explores the reasoning of the court and 
potential avenues for accountability for the climate effects of Arctic petroleum 
production. While the mainstream interpretation of the current international 
economic extraction is potentially feasible.’ Thomas Bruckner, Igor Bashmakov, and Yacob 
Mulugetta, ‘Energy Systems,’ in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change Working 
Group III Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, edited by IPCC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 525.
2 Ibid.
3 Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, ‘The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused 
When Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C,’ 517 Nature 187 (2015). While not all of the crude oil 
is used for energy production, only about 7 per cent of fossil fuels is used for non-combustion 
purposes in the United States (US Energy Information Administration, 2018), <www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=35672>); in the European Union, about 14 per cent of oil is used for 
non-energy purposes (Eurostat, 2017), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php?title=Oil_and_petroleum_products__a_statistical_overview#Use_of_petroleum_products>.
4 McGlade and Ekins, ibid., at 187.
5 Arctic Ocean States are Denmark (via Greenland), Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States. On resource estimations see Peter Stauffer, ‘US Geological Survey (USGS) Circum-Arctic 
Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,’<http://
library.arcticportal.org/1554/>.
6 For discoveries in Norway, see Norwegian Petroleum ‘Discoveries,’ <www.norskpetroleum.
no/en/facts/discoveries/>. For an overview of offshore projects in the Russian Arctic, see 
Rosneft ‘Offshore Projects,’ <www.rosneft.com/business/Upstream/Offshoreprojects/>. For 
the US Arctic, see Bureau of Ocean Energy Management ‘Exploration Plans,’ <www.boem.gov/
regions/exploration-plans>.
7 Natur og Ungdom, Föreningen Greenpeace Norden v. Government of Norway (23 January 2020) 
Bogarting Court of Appeal 18-060499ASD-BORG/03. English translation available at <http://
climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/greenpeace-nordic-assn-and-nature-youth-v-norway-
ministry-of-petroleum-and-energy/> (hereinafter Greenpeace v. Norway 2020). Throughout the 
paper the word ‘petroleum’ is used as a collective term for hydrocarbons and includes both oil 
and gas, in line with the definition of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, <www.npd.no/en/
About-us/Information-services/Dictionary/>.
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legal framework does not pronounce Arctic petroleum production unlawful 
on climate-protection grounds, transparency about the full climatic effects of 
petroleum exploration and production (E&P) activities, about subsidies for 
fossil fuels, and about any further support for the petroleum industry, is in line 
with the current climate change regime.
The idea of regulation of the supply side of the fossil-fuel industry for effec-
tive mitigation of climate change is gaining increasing support among scien-
tists, economists, and lawyers alike.8 Climatic Change and Climate Policy hosted 
special issues on the role of fossil-fuel supply and climate policy, contributions 
to which examined, among other things, the emerging trend of ‘anti-fossil fuel 
norms,’9 as well as equity and justice concerns of a managed fossil-fuel phase-
out.10 Scholars also have argued that certain fossil-fuel development projects 
are incompatible with global climate goals. They include Canada’s oil-sands 
expansion11 and new coal development,12 even where permits have already 
been awarded.13 At the same time, there is a growing body of scholarship on 
8 Beate Sjåfjell and Anita Margrethe Halvorssen, ‘The Legal Status of Oil and Gas Exploitation 
in the Arctic: The Case of Norway,’ 2 OGEL 1 (2016); Roman Sidortsov, ‘Creating Arctic 
Carbon Lock-In: Case Study of New Oil Development in the South Kara Sea,’ CCLR 3 
(2012). In economics, see Hans-Werner Sinn, The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach 
to Global Warming (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). See also Georgia Piggot et al. 
‘Swimming Upstream: Addressing Fossil Fuel Supply under the UNFCCC,’ 18(9) Climate 
Policy 1189 (2018); Michael Lazarus and Harro van Asselt, ‘Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate 
Policy: Exploring the Road Less Taken,’ 150 Climatic Change 1 (2018); Cleo Verkuijl et al., 
‘Aligning Fossil Fuel Production with the Paris Agreement: Insights for the UNFCCC Talanoa 
Dialogue’ (Stockholm Environmental Institute, 2018), <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
resource/11_12_13__SEI_Talanoa_Fossil_Fuels.pdf>; Frank McDonald, ‘Two-Thirds of Energy 
Sector Will Have to Be Left Undeveloped, Bonn Conference Told’ The Irish Times, 12 June 
2013, <www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/two-thirds-of-energy-sector-will-have-to-
be-left-undeveloped-bonn-conference-told-1.1425009>.
9 Fergus Green, ‘Anti-Fossil Fuel Norms,’ 150 Climatic Change 103 (2018).
10 Sivan Kartha et al., ‘Whose Carbon Is Burnable? Equity Considerations in the Allocation of 
a “Right to Extract”,’ 150 Climatic Change 117 (2018); Greg Muttitt and Sivan Kartha, ‘Equity, 
Climate Justice and Fossil Fuel Extraction: Principles for a Managed Phase Out,’ 20(8) Climate 
Policy 1024 (2020); Fergus Green and Ajay Gambhir, ‘Transitional Assistance Policies for Just, 
Equitable and Smooth Low-Carbon Transitions: Who, What and How?,’ 20(8) Climate Policy 
902 (2020).
11 Mark Jaccard, James Hoffele, and Torsten Jaccard, ‘Global Carbon Budgets and the Viability 
of New Fossil Fuel Projects,’ 150 Climatic Change 15 (2018).
12 Roman Mendelevitch, ‘Testing Supply-Side Climate Policies for the Global Steam Coal 
Market—Can They Curb Coal Consumption?,’ 150 Climatic Change 57 (2018).
13 Ryan Rafati, Sugandha Srivastav, and Björn Hoops, ‘Revoking Coal Mining Permits: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis,’ 20(8) Climate Policy 980 (2020).
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the legal nature of state obligations under the climate change regime.14 With 
the turn from the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol to the transpar-
ency-oriented Paris Agreement, the importance of reporting obligations is 
growing.15
This paper builds on existing studies by considering the supply-side regu-
lation of climate change mitigation in the Arctic context. Two arguments are 
made: first, that there is a case for the consideration of the climatic effects of 
fossil-fuel supply that is not limited to the effects of E&P activities but extends 
to the use of the supplied resources (what I call the “entailed” impacts or 
effects). To that end, while the current international legal framework does not 
impose limits on fossil-fuel production or tackle the entailed impacts of such 
activities, procedural obligations based on accountability and transparency 
should be put in place, with the ultimate goal of limiting environmental harm, 
including from climate change. The second argument is that, if such obliga-
tions were to arise, it would be appropriate to apply them to Arctic offshore 
petroleum as a matter of priority because of the Arctic’s significance to the 
climate system and the Arctic states’ historic contribution to climate change 
and their current economic capabilities.
Nevertheless, the arguments and proposals made in this paper are not 
uniquely applicable to the Arctic Ocean states; instead, the region is chosen 
as a case study because of its unusual importance to the global climate system 
and its emerging role as a petroleum-producing area on a large scale.
The next section discusses the Norwegian case and its reasoning. Section 3 
considers the arguments for and against supply-side regulation and discusses 
the incompatibility of global climate goals with the further development of 
Arctic petroleum. Lastly, section 4 considers how climate treaties approach 
fossil-fuel production and examines further options for increased accountabil-
ity for such production in Arctic waters through the establishment of transpar-
ency systems and the inclusion of entailed climatic effects in reporting and in 
environmental impact assessment (eia) processes.
14 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate 
Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Benoit Mayer, The International 
Law on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Benoit Mayer, 
‘International Law Obligations Arising in Relation to Nationally Determined Contributions,’ 
7 Transnational Environmental Law 251 (2018).
15 See, e.g., Meinhard Doelle, ‘The Heart of the Paris Rulebook: Communicating NDCs and 
Accounting for Their Implementation,’ 9(1–2) Climate Law 3 (2019).
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2 The Norwegian Case: ‘People v. Arctic Oil’
In the case dubbed People v. Arctic Oil, two environmental ngos argued that the 
Norwegian government’s decision to award production licenses in the Barents 
Sea violates the right to a healthy environment recognized in the Norwegian 
Constitution and is incompatible with Norway’s obligations under the climate 
change treaties, notwithstanding the fact that Norway exports most of the 
petroleum it produces.16 The case had been decided in favour of the govern-
ment.17 While the Court of Appeal, in January 2020, confirmed the holding,18 
the judgment does not in principle dispense with the possibility of accounta-
bility for what might be called exported emissions, and it offers some insights 
on the inclusion of entailed climatic effects at the planning stage.
2.1 Role of the Paris Agreement
The main legal basis for the case was not international climate change law but 
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution, which establishes a right to a healthy 
environment. The Paris Agreement was imported into the discussion by the 
claimants, who asserted before the Oslo District Court that international obli-
gations are relevant to the interpretation of Article 112.19 One limb of the claim-
ants’ argument concerned the incompatibility of new petroleum development 
with Norway’s obligations under the climate change treaties. The government 
retorted that there existed ‘no duty for Norwegian authorities to take measures 
with respect to emissions abroad nor emissions stemming from the export of 
oil and gas from Norway.’20 The District Court considered the aims of the Paris 
Agreement and highlighted the ambitious climate-related pledges that Norway 
had made pursuant to it, including a multitude of mitigation measures, con-
cluding, nevertheless, that the Agreement was not an appropriate legal basis 
for the consideration of the lawfulness of exported emissions, as it attributes to 
a state only those emissions that arise in the state’s own territory.21 With regard 
to obligations under international law, the Court decided that ‘Neither Norway 
16 Föreningen Greenpeace Norden, Natur og Ungdom v the Government of Norway (4 January 
2018) Oslo District Court 16-166674TVI-OTIR/06. English translation available at <http://
climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/greenpeace-nordic-assn-and-nature-youth-v-norway-
ministry-of-petroleum-and-energy/> (hereinafter Greenpeace v Norway 2018).
17 Ibid.
18 Greenpeace v Norway 2020, supra note 7.
19 Greenpeace v Norway 2018, supra note 16, at 7.
20 Ibid., at 10.
21 Ibid., at 21.
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nor countries in the same situation have any duty to take measures to compen-
sate for the effect from oil and gas exported to other countries.’22
2.2 Exported Emissions
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while there may be legal implications 
for the entailed climatic effects of petroleum production, these would have to 
stem from Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution;23 from which it followed 
that, even if Norwegian oil-and-gas exports had global effects, ‘it will be the 
environmental effects in Norway that are the key issue’24 for the purposes of 
the assessment.
The Court of Appeal gave weight to the defences of ‘marginal contribution’ 
and ‘market substitution,’ as well as to the limited powers of the judiciary in 
questions of climate change. In particular, it found that the greenhouse gas 
contribution of Norway’s petroleum production was ‘marginal’ in the con-
text of both global emissions and Norway’s national emissions.25 From a 
counterfactual analysis of what would happen if Norway gradually phased 
out its oil-and-gas exports, the Court concluded that it would ‘not necessar-
ily mean that the world’s energy requirements as a whole will be covered in 
a more climate-friendly manner.’26 To support these conclusions, the Court 
relied on studies of production substitution, which, the Court conceded, were 
‘controversial.’27
Lastly, the Court of Appeal emphasized the ‘socio-economic and political 
balancing’28 and the limited power of the courts in general to review cer-
tain decisions (presumably including the decision to authorize petroleum 
production).
2.3 Entailed Climatic Effects in eia
It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal took a stance on the potential inclu-
sion of the implied climatic effects of petroleum production in the scope of the 
eia process. While the climatic effects of proposed petroleum E&P activities 
do have to be considered under current arrangements, the down-the-line com-
bustion of the produced resources need not be taken into account. However, 
the relevant eia provisions use flexible language and include ‘positive, negative, 
22 Ibid., at 20.
23 Greenpeace v Norway 2020, supra note 7, at 21.
24 Ibid., at 30.
25 Ibid., at 29.
26 Ibid., at 30.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., at 31.
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direct, indirect, temporary, permanent, short-term and long-term effects’29 of a 
proposed activity, which could include entailed emissions from exports.30 The 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that there is a connection between produc-
tion and combustion, and ‘by far, the greatest emissions occur in connection 
with the combustion.’31 It considered the effects of Norwegian oil and gas on 
the climate system, but concluded that the climatic effects associated with the 
petroleum licenses in question were negligible in the global context.32 While 
the Constitution’s environmental-rights provision did not provide a specific 
threshold of acceptable harm, the ‘threshold for finding a violation of Article 
112 … is high.’33 In the case in hand, the Court of Appeal found that ‘on the basis 
of an overall assessment of the elements that have been reviewed,’ the thresh-
old had not been exceeded.34
Nevertheless, the judgment offers the first judicial interpretation of the entailed 
climatic effects of Arctic petroleum production, and the final decision is yet to be 
made by the Norwegian Supreme Court; hearings were due to start in November 
2020.35 The decision has already indirectly been addressed by the UN Economic 
and Social Council, which expressed concern about the Barents Sea petroleum 
licenses and recommended that Norway ‘reconsider its decision to increase oil 
and natural gas exploitation and take its human rights obligations as a primary 
consideration in its natural resource exploitation and export policies.’36
The next section considers how the Norwegian courts’ arguments could be 
countered in the future with the aim of giving special consideration to Arctic 
petroleum resources.
3 Supply-Side Regulation of Fossil Fuels, and the Arctic’s Resources
In global regulatory efforts on climate change, most attention is given to 
fossil-fuel consumption, disregarding the supply side, except for fugitive 
29 Norwegian Regulations on Impact Assessments (2017) section 21, <www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/regulations-on-impact-assessments/id2573435/>.
30 Greenpeace v Norway 2020, supra note 7, at 41.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., at 25–6.
33 Ibid., at 31.
34 Ibid.
35 Alte Staalesen, ‘Supreme Court to Decide in Landmark Climate Case against Arctic Oil 
in November’ The Barents Observer, 10 June 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/
ecology/2020/06/supreme-court-decide-landmark-climate-case-against-arctic-oil-november>.
36 UN Economic and Social Council, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of 
Norway (2 April 2020) E/C.12/NOR/CO/6, para. 11.
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emissions.37 Under such a framework, it is entirely acceptable for a state, such 
as Norway or the United Kingdom, to aim for carbon neutrality38 while concur-
rently approving large-scale fossil-fuel production,39 providing subsidies to the 
fossil-fuel industry,40 managing state oil-and-gas companies involved in E&P 
at home and abroad, and producing petroleum within the state’s jurisdiction 
for export. All of this may be done without any requirement for being transpar-
ent about the potential extraterritorial contribution of these actions to climate 
change.41
There is growing support for supply-side measures in general. Over 500 envi-
ronmental ngos from 76 countries signed the 2017 Lofoten Declaration call-
ing for ‘the wealthy fossil fuel producers to lead in putting an end to fossil fuel 
development and to manage the decline of existing production.’42 This position 
is supported by some politicians and industry representatives. In the last two 
years of the Obama Administration, for example, much attention was focused 
on climate change.43 In discussing the controversial Keystone XL Pipeline 
37 Fugitive emissions refer to emissions from oil-and-gas production activities (excluding the 
combustion of produced resources). See Christian Boettcher et al., ‘Fugitive Emissions,’ in 
2019 Refinement to the 2006 ipcc Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (vol. 
2, 2019) at 4.2, <www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2019rf/vol2.html>.
38 Norway’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (2016), <www4.unfccc.int/sites/
ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Norway%20First/NorwayINDC%20(Archived).pdf>; 
United Kingdom, Climate Change Act 2008, section 1.
39 E.g. in January 2020, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate offered 69 new production 
licenses, including 13 in the Barents Sea; see ‘APA 2019: Licence Shares Offered to 28 
Companies’ (14 January 2020), <www.npd.no/en/facts/news/general-news/2020/apa-2019-
licence-shares-offered-to-28-companies/>. The UK is pursuing the ‘Maximising Economic 
Recovery’ strategy with regards to its petroleum production since 2016; see Oil and Gas 
Authority, <www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3229/mer-uk-strategy.pdf>.
40 On the links between the climate change regime and fossil fuel subsidies, see Harro Van 
Asselt, Laura Merrill, and Kati Kulovesi, ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidies and the Global Climate 
Regime,’ in The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Their Reform, edited by Harro Van Asselt 
and Jakob Skovgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
41 Indeed, the fourth biennial reports for Canada, Norway, and Russia, in their sections on the 
energy sector, refer to the consumption of energy (e.g. increasing the share of low carbon 
sources and improving energy efficiency) and fugitive emissions of the upstream petroleum 
sector. Norway’s Fourth Biennial Report under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (2 April 2020), at 30–39; Canada’s Fourth Biennial Report on Climate Change (13 
February 2020), at 14–21; Russia’s Fourth Biennial Report Submitted in Accordance with 
the unfccc cop Decision 1/CP.16 (30 April 2020), at 22–30, 38–40 (in Russian), <https://
unfccc.int/BRs>.
42 See <www.lofotendeclaration.org/>. The declaration is not legally binding.
43 Wilfrid Greaves, ‘Climate Change, Energy Security, and the Arctic Under the Obama 
Presidency,’ World Policy Blog, 13 October 2016, <www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/10/13/
climate-change-energy-security-and-arctic-under-obama-presidency>.
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project, the US president said: ‘if we’re going to prevent large parts of this Earth 
from becoming not only inhospitable but uninhabitable in our lifetimes, we’re 
going to have to keep some fossil fuels in the ground rather than burn them and 
release more dangerous pollution into the sky.’44 A 2016 report by the French 
energy company Total stressed that ‘the 2°C scenario highlights that a part of 
the world’s fossil fuel resources cannot be developed.’45 The World Bank is no 
longer financing oil-and-gas projects, on climate change grounds.46 For the 
Arctic context specifically, Sjåfjell and Halvorssen examined the climatic impli-
cations of new oil development in Norway, arguing that investing in oil-and-gas 
operations and carbon-intensive infrastructure over the next thirty years in the 
Arctic ‘is clearly against the object and purpose of the unfccc and the Paris 
Agreement, when the international community should be phasing out fossil 
fuel use and moving toward renewable energy across the globe.’47
There are two main objections to supply-side regulation: first, current climate 
change regulation concentrates on emissions, so placing any limitation on the 
supply of fossil fuels is outside the scope of regulation and could lead to duplica-
tive regulation; second, the unaffected demand will cause the fossil fuels to be 
produced elsewhere. In relation to the latter, the question arises: Why should the 
Arctic states be the ones to bear responsibility when they have vast experience in 
offshore development and can do it in a more environmentally friendly manner?
The responses to these two main objections are discussed in the sections 
below.
3.1 ‘But We Have an Emission-Centred Regime’
Economists, environmental ngos, and political scientists have advanced argu-
ments in favour of supply-side regulation.48 There are two main lines. The first 
44 The White House Press Secretary, ‘Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline 
(6 November 2015).
45 Justin Leroux and Daniel Spiro, ‘Leading the Unwilling: Unilateral Strategies to Prevent 
Arctic Oil Exploration,’ 54 Resource and Energy Economics 125 (2018).
46 The statement reads ‘in exceptional circumstances, consideration will be given to 
financing upstream gas in the poorest countries where there is a clear benefit in 
terms of energy access for the poor and the project fits within the countries’ Paris 
Agreement commitments’. World Bank Group Announcements at One Planet 
Summit (12 December 2017), <www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/12/12/
world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-summit>.
47 Sjåfjell and Halvorssen, supra note 8, at 16–17. See also Sidortsov, supra note 8, on Russian 
Arctic oil and climate change goals.
48 Lazarus and van Asselt, supra note 8; Taran Faehn et al., ‘Climate Policies in a Fossil Fuel 
Producing Country: Demand versus Supply Side Policies,’ 38 The Energy Journal 77 (2017); 
Greg Muttitt, ‘The Sky’s Limit: Why the Paris Climate Goals Require a Managed Decline 
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is the ‘green paradox’ argument advanced by Sinn, which posits that fossil-fuel 
producers, facing stringent emission-reduction policies in the long term, are 
incentivized to increase production in the short and medium terms.49 Because 
demand decreases inconsistently, the produced fossil fuels will flood those 
markets in which emission standards are not as ambitious. Considering that 
large-scale Arctic resource development will only occur when most European 
countries will have a significantly reduced demand for fossil fuels, these 
resources are likely to end up in countries with less ambitious climate goals.
The second line of argument relates to just transition. As it is already clear 
that not all fossil-fuel resources can be developed, a managed reduction in 
supply can help achieve a just transition for states and their citizens.50 In 
petroleum-producing countries, the oil-and-gas industry normally plays a 
central role in revenue generation and employment. Despite full knowledge 
of the boom-and-bust cycle that characterizes most extractive-industry pro-
jects, the impact of a sudden petroleum-industry crash on communities could 
be economically devastating.51 A managed decline in fossil-fuel production, 
as opposed to unexpected downturns caused by an oil-price crash or a global 
pandemic, will help diversify economies and decrease the social costs of the 
transition process.52
At a global scale, the emission-focused framework is proving insufficient 
on its own, in the absence of universal, binding emission targets. The issue of 
duplicative regulation is an important one, but is not prohibitive to supply-side 
measures. The principle of extended producer responsibility is common in 
environmental policy, particularly in waste regulation, extending responsibility 
of Fossil Fuel Production’ (Oil Change International, 2016), <http://priceofoil.org/content/
uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf>; Geir B. Asheim, ‘A Distributional 
Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies’ 56 Environmental and Resource Economics 239 
(2013); Sinn, supra note 8.
49 Sinn, supra note 8. See also Asheim, ibid.
50 Kartha et al., supra note 10; Muttitt, supra note 48; Muttitt and Kartha, supra note 10.
51 In Aberdeen (Scotland), in the year following the 2014 oil-price fall, the number of people 
claiming unemployment benefits more than doubled, having a knock-on effect on the local 
councils, housing market, and hospitality industry: Andrew Aiton et al., ‘Aberdeen and 
Aberdeenshire since the Oil Price Fall’ (Scottish Parliament Financial Scrutiny Unit Note, 
2015), <www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_15-44_Aberdeen_
and_Aberdeenshire_since_the_oil_price_fall.pdf>. See more generally, Philippe Le Billon 
and Elizabeth Good, ‘Responding to the Commodity Bust: Downturns, Policies and Poverty 
in Extractive Sector Dependent Countries’, 3(1) Extractive Industries and Society 204 (2016); 
Muttitt and Kartha, supra note 10, at 1026–7.
52 Kartha et al., supra note 10; Muttitt, supra note 48; Muttitt and Kartha, supra note 10.
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for a product ‘to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle.’53 A number 
of alternative accounting methodologies have been put forward, not only for 
the consideration of fossil-fuel production but also for the ‘carbon footprint 
[of countries] based on the products they import.’54 Accounting for exported 
emissions does not have to replace the existing framework, but could run ‘in 
parallel to monitor the alignment of fossil fuel supply with climate goals.’55
3.2 ‘If It Doesn’t Come from the Arctic, It Will Come from Elsewhere’
The second objection is related to the so-called market-substitution assump-
tion, which claims that if petroleum is not produced in the Arctic, it will come 
from elsewhere, making no difference to global emissions.56 This argument 
was used by the US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in the eia for the 
latest Arctic offshore field, Liberty. Citing ‘market substitution’, the Bureau 
stated that if oil is not produced at Liberty, it would ‘be procured from other 
sources.’57
There are a number of factual, economic, and ethical arguments against 
the market-substitution assumption.58 Supporters of it are correct in saying 
that the type of resource that would substitute the proposed development has 
a direct effect on the level of potential climate benefits from abandoning a 
53 See, e.g., European Commission dg Environment, ‘Development of Guidance on Extended 
Producer Responsibility’ (2014), <https://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/waste/eu_
guidance/pdf/Guidance%20on%20EPR%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf>.
54 Steven J. Davis, Glen P. Peters, and Ken Caldeira, ‘The Supply Chain of CO2 Emissions’, 
108(45) PNAS 18554 (2011); Peter Erickson and Michael Lazarus, ‘Accounting for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Associated with the Supply of Fossil Fuels’ (Stockholm Environment Institute, 
2013), <www.sei.org/publications/accounting-for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-associated-
with-the-supply-of-fossil-fuels/>; Karl W. Steininger, et al., ‘Multiple Carbon Accounting 
to Support Just and Effective Climate Policies,’ 6(1) Nature Climate Change 35 (2016). On 
imported emissions accounting see, e.g., Arnold Tukker, Richard Wood, and Sarah Schmidt, 
‘Towards Accepted Procedures for Calculating International Consumption-based Carbon 
Accounts’, 20(S1) Climate Policy s90 (2020).
55 Piggot et al., supra note 8, at 1194.
56 See criticism of Australian courts adopting this argument, in Justine Bell-James and Brianna 
Collins ‘“If We Don’t Mine Coal, Someone Else Will”: Debunking the “Market Substitution 
Assumption” in Queensland Climate Change Litigation,’ 37 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 167 (2020).
57 Liberty Development and Production Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement, vol 2 
Chapter 7 and Appendices A through C.’ OCS EIS/EABOEM 2018–050, <www.boem.gov/
sites/default/files/about-boem/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Leasing-and-Plans/Plans/
Vol-2-Liberty-FEIS.pdf>.
58 See Bell-James and Collins, supra note 56.
shapovalova
Climate Law 10 (2020) 282-307Downloaded from Brill.com11/25/2020 09:09:17AM
via University of Aberdeen
293
given fossil-fuel project.59 However, it should not be assumed that undevel-
oped oil would be substituted by coal or like-oil and not a less climatically 
impactful energy source. Supply of fossil fuels has a long-term impact on 
demand through price formation and availability, especially in the presence 
of alternative energy sources.60 The market-substitution assumption allows 
for deflection of responsibility for emissions through oversimplification of 
the supply-demand interactions in the global energy market.61 For an argu-
ment with such potential legal and policy strength, the burden of proof that its 
proponents carry does not seem to be very high.62 In the Norwegian case, the 
court simply referred to one scholarly article without further considering the 
counter-arguments.63
Finally, there is a logical issue with this argument. As Justice Preston, of the 
New South Wales Land and Environment Court, put it: ‘If a development will 
cause an environmental impact that is found to be unacceptable, the envi-
ronmental impact does not become acceptable because a hypothetical and 
uncertain alternative development might also cause the same unacceptable 
environmental impact.’64
With regard to the Arctic, this section will further develop three arguments 
related to the special nature of Arctic resources.
First, economic analysis shows that leaving in place high-cost reserves 
would result in ‘reduction of total and early emissions.’65 Such reserves are usu-
ally associated with higher extraction emissions than average operations, and 
it would be more cost-efficient not to exploit them due to their smaller profit 
margin.66 Arctic offshore petroleum resources are among the most expensive 
59 See, e.g., Michael Hoel, ‘Supply Side Climate Policy and the Green Paradox’ (CREE Working 
Paper 2/2013 2013) <www.cree.uio.no/publications/CREE_working_papers/pdf_2013/
supplysideclimate_14jan_v9_withfigv3_cree_wp2_201.pdf>.
60 See Bell-James and Collins, supra note 56, at 174–5, discussing these arguments vis-à-vis the 
coal market in Australia.
61 Both supply and demand are influenced by a number of factors not related to available 
quantities and price, including environmental disasters, energy security considerations, and 
energy and climate policies. See, e.g., Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Energy Economics: Concepts, 
Issues, Markets and Governance (London: Springer, 2011).
62 On the criticism of the expert submissions regarding market substitution in Australian 
courts, see Bell-James and Collins, supra note 56, at 180–2.
63 Greenpeace v. Norway 2020, supra note 7, at 30.
64 Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7, at paragraph 545.
65 Hoel, supra note 59, at 15. The only instance in which the climate still ‘may be adversely 
affected,’ according to Hoel, is if the backstop emissions are higher than those from the high-
cost reserves.
66 Hoel, supra note 59; Bård Harstad, ‘Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy,’ 
120 (1) Journal of Political Economy 77 (2012).
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oil resources to extract globally due to the need to develop substantial new 
weather-appropriate infrastructure, higher costs of shipping, and higher 
costs of compliance with environmental and safety regulations.67 The Arctic 
region is not homogenous, and Norwegian Arctic oil is easier and cheaper to 
develop due to milder weather conditions and existing infrastructure in that 
region.68 Furthermore, a high price for development is not always a deterrent 
when there are considerations of maintaining export output or preservation 
of energy security. For example, the Russian government continues to provide 
substantial support for its petroleum industry in the North while pursuing its 
wider national policies.69
Second, considering the problem of carbon lock-in, it is unlikely that only 
a small part of Arctic resources would be developed. The costly infrastructure 
required to develop these resources and deliver them to the market would 
require large, long-term investments, prompting increased petroleum devel-
opment activities in an attempt to make profitable returns.70 Companies 
developing such resources, and states profiting from them, are motivated to 
maximize their revenue generation. Legal measures adopted to maximize eco-
nomic recovery from mature and maturing provinces, especially with high-cost 
reserves, include special-condition licenses and tax regimes.71 Such measures 
67 Russian Arctic oil development break-even cost is about 120 usd per barrel, <https://
knoema.com/OILSTAT2017/oil-statistics-production-costs-breakeven-price-
discontinued?tsId=1000310>. The average cost of Arctic oil production is US$75 per barrel, 
more expensive than deep water drilling and Canadian oil sands production: Deloitte, Crude 
Awakening (2015), <www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/energy-and-resources/articles/crude-
awakening.html>. See also James Henderson and Julie Loe, The Prospects and Challenges for 
Arctic Oil Development (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2014), at 55–6.
68 Justin Leroux and Daniel Spiro, ‘Leading the Unwilling: Unilateral Strategies to Prevent 
Arctic Oil Exploration,’ 54 Resource and Energy Economics 125 (2018).
69 See Daria Shapovalova, Eduard Galimullin, and Ekaterina Grushevenko, ‘Russian Arctic 
Offshore Petroleum Governance: The Effects of Western Sanctions and Outlook for Northern 
Development,’ 146 Energy Policy (2020).
70 See, e.g., Sidortsov, supra note 8; Peter Erickson et al., ‘Assessing Carbon Lock-In’, 10 
Environmental Research Letters 084023 (2015); Arild Moe and Svein Vigeland Rottem, 
‘Offshore Petroleum and Maritime Infrastructure’, in Arctic in World Affairs, edited by Oran 
Young et al. (KMI/East-West Center, 2014).
71 Greg Gordon, John Paterson, and Uisdean Vass, ‘The Wood Review and Maximizing 
Economic Recovery upon the UKCS,’ in UK Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging 
Trends (Vol. I: Resource Management and Regulatory Law), edited by Greg Gordon, John 
Paterson, and Emre Üşenmez, (3rd edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018); 
Tina Hunter, ‘Converging Energy Governance in Mature Petroleum Provinces: Political, 
Legal and Economic Dimensions in Governing Mature Petroleum Fields in the North Sea,’ 
in The International Political Economy of Oil and Gas, edited by Slawomir Raszewski (Cham: 
Springer, 2018).
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have been adopted in a number of countries, including the United Kingdom 
and Norway.72
Third, building on notions of equity and justice, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (cbdr-rc) applies in 
these circumstances.73 Considerations of equity are paramount in establishing 
procedural obligations regarding petroleum development. This is especially 
relevant in the context of the scholarly debates on the ‘right to extract.’74 It is 
relevant to consider historical contributions, the present economic capabilities, 
and the level of dependence on fossil-fuel rent.75 While devolved or indigenous 
self-governance entities exist in the Arctic which could potentially benefit eco-
nomically from offshore petroleum development, these resources are regulated 
primarily by central or federal governments. The Arctic Ocean states which are 
currently involved (or planning to be) in oil-and-gas development in the region 
are (except for Greenland) historically large petroleum producers and exporters 
with a relatively high gdp.76 Petroleum exports have had a central role in the 
economies of Canada, Russia, and Norway, and to a lesser extent the United 
States.77 Historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions is high for the 
United States, Canada, and Russia, and to a lesser extent for Norway—and 
72 UK Oil and Gas Authority, The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK (2016), 
<www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3229/mer-uk-strategy.pdf>; Hunter, ibid.
73 On differentiation in the climate change regime, see Christina Voigt and Felipe Ferreira, 
‘Differentiation in the Paris Agreement,’ 6(1–2) Climate Law 58 (2016); Lavanya Rajamani, 
‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and 
Underlying Politics,’ 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493 (2016). Cf. Eric 
A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010).
74 Kartha et al., supra note 10.
75 Philippe Le Billon and Berit Kristoffersen, ‘Just Cuts for Fossil Fuels? Supply-Side Carbon 
Constraints and Energy Transition,’ Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 1 
(2019), at 10.
76 International Monetary Fund rankings of gdp per capita place Canada in the 19th, Norway 
in the 5th, the United States in the 7th, and Russia in the 68th place, 2019 data, <www.imf.
org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD>.
77 In Canada and the United States, crude oil’s share in exports share is 14 and 6 per cent 
respectively, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, <https://oec.world/en/>. 
In Norway the petroleum sector comprises 16 per cent of gdp and 37 per cent of total exports: 
Norsk Petroleum, Government Revenues (2020), <www.norskpetroleum.no/en/economy/
governments-revenues/>. In Russia, revenue from the oil-and-gas sector consistently 
accounts for about 40 per cent of the federal budget (Russian Ministry of Finance, Statistics), 
<www.minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/execute/?id_65=80041-yezhegodnaya_informatsiya_
ob_ispolnenii_federalnogo_byudzhetadannye_s_1_yanvarya_2006_g>).
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negligible for Greenland.78 Greenland is a clear outlier, with potentially high 
economic dependency on petroleum exports should commercial production 
begin. On the other hand, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States have 
more capacity for transition and a greater degree of responsibility.79
3.3 The Current State of Arctic Petroleum Development
The Arctic Ocean states are on the brink of large-scale offshore petroleum pro-
duction. Although large discoveries have been made, offshore production is 
limited for now to a small number of fields in Norway, Russia, and the United 
States. Despite the slow pace of development, with the rapidly melting sea 
ice, the Arctic offshore oil-and-gas deposits are likely to be extracted in the 
next few decades if no regulatory constraints are put in place. All Arctic Ocean 
states place resource extraction at the centre of their Arctic and energy poli-
cies,80 while Russia also heavily subsidizes its Arctic E&P activities.81
Russia was the first country to start developing Arctic oil offshore, at its 
Prirazlomnaya field, in 2014. Norway followed, with Barents Sea oil production 
at the Gøliat field starting in 2016; the Johan Castberg field, currently under 
development, is due to start production in 2022.82 Off the coast of Alaska, oil 
is being produced using artificial islands, at the Northstar, Nikaitchuq, and 
Oooguruk fields. Further offshore, the Liberty project, which also uses an arti-
ficial island, received regulatory approval for its final Environmental Impact 
Statement in August 2018.83 As for natural gas, only Norway is currently produc-
ing it offshore, at the Snøhvit field; Russia is opting for onshore development, 
using liquefied natural gas (lng) technology to deliver the gas to the market.84 
Canadian offshore development in the Arctic is on hold due to the harsher 
78 World Resources Institute, Ranking of Countries by Greenhouse Gas Emissions over 
Time, 1850–2014, <www.wri.org/blog/2018/04/5-charts-show-how-global-emissions-have-
changed-1850>.
79 See the analysis in Muttitt and Kartha, supra note 10, arriving at a similar conclusion.
80 Daria Shapovalova, ‘Special Rules for the Arctic? Comparative Analysis of Safety and 
Environmental Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Development in the Arctic Ocean States,’ 
in In Search for Arctic Marine Sustainability: Arctic Maritime Businesses and Resilience of the 
Marine Environment, edited by Eva Pongrácz, Victor Pavlov, and Niko Hänninen (Cham: 
Springer, 2020).
81 Lars Petter Lunden and Daniel Fjaertoft, Government Support to Upstream Oil and Gas in 
Russia: How Subsidies Influence the Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe Projects (The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development/WWF, 2014); Shapovalova, Galimullin and 
Grushevenko, supra note 69.
82 Norsk Petroleum, <www.norskpetroleum.no/en/facts/field/johan-castberg/>.
83 US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, <www.boem.gov/about-boem/hilcorp-alaska-llc>.
84 See, e.g., Yamal LNG, <http://yamallng.ru/en/>.
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climatic conditions, lack of infrastructure, and stringent regulatory require-
ments.85 In Greenland, industry interest has declined as a result of a number of 
unsuccessful exploration efforts in 2010–11.86
International law confirms the right of a coastal state to regulate resource 
extraction in its exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf.87 However, 
this right is not absolute and is subject to the applicable rules on prevention and 
mitigation of environmental harm, contained both in treaties and customary 
law.88 Aside from climatic concerns, Arctic petroleum development raises a num-
ber of questions on the role of international law in effectively regulating maritime 
delimitation,89 shipping,90 marine pollution,91 and indigenous rights.92
4 Accountability for Arctic Petroleum Production through 
Assessment and Transparency
Although the climate treaties do not impose direct obligations to limit 
petroleum production, there is a case to be made for enhanced accountabil-
ity through assessment and transparency of the contribution of new petro-
leum-production projects to climate change. This is already required by the 
85 See section on Canada in Shapovalova, supra note 80. Since 2016, a moratorium 
on new offshore licenses has been in place in the Canadian Arctic. United States-
Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 2016, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/12/20/
united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement>.
86 ‘Cairn Energy Turns Up Another Dry Well in Greenland,’ BBC, 28 September 2011, <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-15087783>. Although Greenland is part 
of Denmark, through the Self-Rule Act of 2009 it has full autonomy over offshore resource 
decision-making.
87 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (hereinafter unclos), articles 56–57, 76–77.
88 unclos, ibid., article 193; on customary rules as applied in the Arctic offshore development, 
see Rachael L. Johnstone, Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic under International 
Law: Risk and Responsibility (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015).
89 See, e.g., Viatcheslav V. Gavrilov, ‘The LOSC and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in 
the Arctic Ocean,’ 31 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 315 (2016).
90 See eg Jesper Jarl Fanø, Enforcing International Maritime Legislation on Air Pollution through 
UNCLOS (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2019).
91 Johnstone, supra note 88; Timo Koivurova and Erik J. Molenaar, International Governance 
and Regulation of the Marine Arctic (WWF International Arctic Programme, 2010); Daria 
Shapovalova, ‘International Governance of Oil Spills from Upstream Petroleum Activities in 
the Arctic: Response over Prevention?,’ 34 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
668 (2019).
92 Johnstone supra note 88, chapter 5; Rachael L. Johnstone, ‘The Impact of International Law 
on Natural Resource Governance in Greenland,’ Polar Record 1 (2020).
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climate treaties and potentially by national legislation. I discuss two comple-
mentary options for achieving this, involving both states and private actors: 
inclusion of entailed climatic effects in the eia process; and inclusion of data 
on fossil-fuel production in the Paris Agreement’s reporting framework. Each 
is discussed below, with reference to the Arctic context.
4.1 eia for Implied Climatic Effects of Petroleum Production
The consideration of ghg emissions from proposed activities is not a new 
development; it has even been argued to be an emerging rule of customary 
law.93 With fossil-fuel development, the problematic issue is the scope of 
assessment of projects. Current common practice is that only upstream emis-
sions, arising from E&P, are being considered.94 Emissions from the down-
stream use of the fossil fuels are not included in the Arctic petroleum eias. 
While the E&P activities do contribute significantly to global emissions, as well 
as to local warming, they constitute a small share compared to emissions from 
the combustion of the extracted resources.95
The rationale for providing information on entailed climatic effects lies 
not just in making available data on potential impacts, but in the inclusion 
of entailed climatic impacts in the body of the eia, which would make such 
effects subject to all of the ancillary obligations that come with it: public scru-
tiny, obligation to consider the no-action alternative, and the possibility of lit-
igation.96 Granted that the calculation and accuracy of the entailed climatic 
93 Benoit Mayer, ‘Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation under Customary 
International Law’ 68 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 271 (2019).
94 This is a general trend, with some exceptions; see Mayer, ibid., at 297–8; Michael Burger and 
Jessica Wentz ‘Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of 
NEPA Review,’ 41 Harvard Environmental Law Review 109 (2017).
95 Upstream emissions contribute to between 5 and 37 per cent of overall lifecycle emissions. 
‘Upstream Emissions as a Percentage of Overall Lifecycle Emissions,’ World Resources 
Institute, 14 December 2016), <www.wri.org/resources/data-visualizations/upstream-
emissions-percentage-overall-lifecycle-emissions>. Short-lived climate forcers associated 
with E&P activities, such as black carbon arising from gas flaring, contribute to local 
warming in the Arctic by reducing the reflectivity of snow and ice; see Andreas Stohl et 
al., ‘Black Carbon in the Arctic: The Underestimated Role of Gas flaring and Residential 
Combustion Emissions, 13(17) Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 8833 (2013).
96 Alan Gilpin, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Cutting Edge for the Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), at 63–73; Timo Koivurova and 
Pamela Lesser, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Guide to Best Practice 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016) at 2–7.
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effects would come with methodological challenges, these are not insur-
mountable, and proposals exist on how to mitigate them.97
In the Arctic offshore petroleum context, eia is a public process in all coun-
tries, except in Russia.98 The Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines adopted 
by all Arctic states within the framework of the Arctic Council provide that an 
eia should consider the proposed activity’s effects on the climate, but they 
appear to limit these to E&P activities.99 This is reflected in domestic practices, 
for example in Norway and the United States, where the climatic effects of 
petroleum production are included in the scope of the eia but limited to E&P 
activities.100
The US offshore oil-and-gas regulator is under increasing scrutiny to include 
entailed climatic effects in Environmental Impact Statements. Burger and 
Wentz note that the regulator did consider the entailed climatic effects of the 
2017–2022 Lease Plan.101 The eia report on the plan considers ‘lifecycle contri-
bution,’ acknowledging the research on the need to leave Arctic resources in 
the ground to meet climate goals.102 The report concludes, without going into 
detail about the methodology used, that the ‘No Action Alternative’ would not 
result in sufficient reductions, due to ‘the economic substitution effects from 
onshore and overseas sources.’103 The US Council on Environmental Quality, 
which decides what an eia should contain, has published a draft guidance on 
97 See, e.g., Stephen Russel, ‘A Recommended Methodology for Estimating and Reporting the 
Potential Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Fossil Fuel Reserves’ (World Resources Institute, 
2016), <https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/WRI16_WorkingPaper_FF.pdf>.
98 Koivurova and Lesser, supra note 96, at 194–5. There is a two-stage environmental assessment 
process in Russia, whereby the project proponent prepares the initial eia and has to consult 
the local public: Order of the State Committee for Ecology of the Russian Federation no. 372 
‘On Approving the Regulation on the Assessment of the Impact of the Planned Economic 
and Other Activities on the Environment in the Russian Federation’ (16 May 2000), section 
4. The information provided, however, is not usually available to the wider public and may 
not contain sufficient information. See critique of Prirazlomnaya eia by wwf at <https://
wwf.ru/upload/iblock/02d/zameqaniy_na_ovos.pdf> (in Russian). In the second stage, the 
state ecological expertise provides for the possibility of offshore petroleum projects due to 
them including commercial or state secrets: Federal Law on Ecological Expertise no. 174-FZ 
(23 November 1995), article 21.
99 Arctic Council, ‘Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines’ (2009) at 8, 13.
100 See, e.g., Norwegian Regulations on Impact Assessments, supra note 29, at sections 10 and 21.
101 Burger and Wentz, supra note 94, at 138–9;.
102 US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, ‘2017–2022 OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program Final 
Programmatic EIS’ (2016), at 4–8, <www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/oil-and-gas-energy-
program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/2012–2017/BOEMOceanInfo/fpeis_volume1.pdf>.
103 Ibid.
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accounting for greenhouse gas emissions in the eia process.104 The guidance 
calls for consideration of both the direct and indirect effects of the action ‘later 
in time or farther removed in distance, but still reasonably foreseeable.’105 
However, it confirms that there is a discretion as to the quantification and con-
sideration of the proposed action’s greenhouse gas emissions, which allows 
agencies to not address emissions where it would be ‘overly speculative.’106 
In relation to the eia for the Liberty project off Alaska, the US regulator was 
asked whether approval of the project was in line with climatic goals. It replied 
using the singular-project-threshold argument, stating that
[it] disagrees with the notion that producing oil from the Liberty pros-
pect would preclude the world from meeting ghg reduction goals and 
would “lock in” specific negative effects associated with climate change. 
There is a finite amount of oil in the Liberty prospect and it is not enough 
to demonstrably influence climate change (in the action area or any-
where else) on its own.107
Regarding the effects of the Liberty project on climate change, the regulator 
‘decline[d] to engage in baseless speculation about which climate change-related 
impacts would be attributable to ghg associated with the Liberty project.’108
The earlier Shell Chukchi Sea environmental report reads:
the incremental increase of effects caused by the Proposed Action to ex-
isting and future impacts of climate change would be negligible and would 
not change the overall level of cumulative impacts to marine mammals 
from other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.109
The US practice on eia for proposed Arctic developments is the most informa-
tive amongst the Arctic jurisdictions. It contains a clear indication that the US 
regulator has come under increased pressure to consider the entailed climatic 
effects of proposed developments.
104 National Environmental Policy Act, Guidance on ghg Accounting (2019), <https://ceq.doe.
gov/guidance/ceq_guidance_nepa-ghg.html>.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Liberty Development and Production Plan, supra note 57, at B-17 to B-19.
108 Ibid., at B-21.
109 US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, ‘Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc Revised Outer 
Continental Shelf Lease Exploration Plan, Chukchi Sea, Alaska’ (2015), at 149–50, <www.
boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_
and_Plans/Plans/2015-05-11-Shell-Chukchi-EA.pdf>. Emphasis added.
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In Russia, one of the rare relevant publicly available eia reports on Arctic 
development comes for the Yamal lng project. In that case, the eia process 
had to comply, in addition, with the requirements of external funders.110 With 
regard to climate impacts, the report mentions greenhouse gas emissions, but 
only those directly arising from the project.111
The environmental risk assessment reports for the Norwegian Johan 
Castberg and Snøhvit projects consider the CO2 emissions of E&P activities, 
but not of the exports and combustion of the extracted resources.112 Norwegian 
and applicable European Union law require the consideration of the climatic 
effects of an activity as part of an eia, but do not specify the scope.113
Based on the practice above, there is little support among regulators in 
Arctic petroleum-producing states for climatic assessment that includes 
entailed emissions. However, the increased scrutiny of the US eia reports and 
the conclusions of the Court of Appeal in Greenpeace v. Norway demonstrate a 
growing support for extending the scope of the assessment to entailed climatic 
effects.
The initiative to begin including entailed impacts could also come from 
industry or financial institutions. Some industry actors are adopting strate-
gies aimed at sustainability and at acknowledging the climatic effects of their 
activities. Among the big Arctic oil players, Italy’s Eni claims to be ‘inspired’ by 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals,114 and the same holds for Norway’s 
Equinor (formerly Statoil).115 Financial institutions providing support for 
extractive projects often impose additional transparency requirements com-
pared to national legislation, as in the case of the Yamal project.
110 In this case, performance standards of the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation, and the oecd. Environ, ‘Environmental and Social Impact Assessment,’ at 1–2 
and 1–3 <http://yamallng.ru/403/docs/ESIA%20ENG%20.pdf>.
111 Ibid., at 9-5 and 9–24.
112 Equinor, ‘Snøhvit and Hammerfest’ (2001) [In Norwegian], <www.equinor.com/en/how-and-
why/impact-assessments.html>. Thema, Johan Castberg: Konsekvenser av Elektrifisering 
(Executive Summary in English) at 6–7, <www.equinor.com/content/dam/statoil/documents/
impact-assessment/johan-castberg/statoil-johan-castberg-konsekvenser-av-elektrifisering.pdf>. 
The ghg emissions from E&P activities in Norway are further subject to the CO2 tax and the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme, see Catherine Banet, ‘Effectiveness in Climate 
Regulation: Simultaneous Application of a Carbon Tax and an Emissions Trading Scheme to the 
Offshore Petroleum Sector in Norway,’ 11 Carbon and Climate Law Review 25 (2017).
113 Norway Regulations on Impact Assessments, supra note 28, at sections 10 and 21; EU 
Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and 
Private Projects on the Environment, article 3(1)(c); Annex iv section 5(f).
114 Eni, ‘Sustainability for Eni,’ <www.eni.com/en-IT/just-transition/sustainability-goals.html>.
115 Equinor, ‘Equinor Sets Ambition to Reduce Net Carbon Intensity by at Least 50% by 2050’ (6 
February 2020), <www.equinor.com/en/news/2020-02-06-climate-roadmap.html>.
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A potential significant shift in the interpretation of the law could come 
from a relevant national court. In addition to the Norwegian court’s decision, 
recent judgments of US and Australian courts acknowledge entailed climatic 
effects in judgments suspending extractive activities based on environmental 
and procedural grounds. In May 2020, Montana’s District Court reversed oil-
and-gas lease sales, largely on the grounds of a failure to include in the eia an 
analysis of the impact of the developments on groundwater.116 The judgment 
further rejected the US Bureau of Land Management’s arguments on the insig-
nificance of the individual developments’ climatic effects, stating that while 
the regulator ‘cannot ascertain exactly how all of these projects contribute to 
climate change impacts felt in the project area, [the Court] knows that less 
greenhouse-gas emissions equals less climate change.’117
This ‘drop in the ocean’118 argument was used by both the Norwegian and 
US regulators, as discussed above. There are two main responses to it: appro-
priate scale comparison; and consideration of cumulative effects. Regulators 
and judges need to compare the impacts of proposed activities to similar pro-
jects at the relevant scale,119 as was done in Rocky Hill case from New South 
Wales.120 In rejecting the coal-mining company’s appeal against the refusal of 
planning permission, the court stated:
It matters not that this aggregate of the Project’s ghg emissions may rep-
resent a small fraction of the global total of ghg emissions. The global 
problem of climate change needs to be addressed by multiple local ac-
tions to mitigate emissions by sources and remove GHGs by sinks.121
In that case, the poor performance of the proposed development in environ-
mental and social impact assessment played the central role in the decision.122 
Nevertheless, judgments acknowledging the entailed climatic effects of fos-
sil-fuel projects could assist in alleviating concerns that climate change is too 
polycentric an issue to be dealt with by the courts.123
116 Wildearth Guardians v. US Bureau of Land Management no: 4:18-cv-00073-BMM (D. Mont. 2020).
117 Ibid., at 28.
118 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Issues in Climate Change Litigation,’ 5(1) Carbon and Climate Law Review 15 
(2011), at 16–17; Mayer, supra note 90, at 295–8.
119 Mayer, supra note 93, at 298.
120 Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning, [2019] NSWLEC 7, at paragraphs 555–6.
121 Ibid., at paragraph 515.
122 Ibid., at paragraph 556.
123 Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford, and Emily Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of 
Climate Change,’ 80 The Modern Law Review 173 (2017).
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Further, it is important to look at the cumulative effects of production 
from the regional or national scale.124 Given the significant potential impact 
of Arctic petroleum development and use on the global climate system, such 
cumulative assessment is especially relevant.
It needs to be acknowledged that even if an assessment of entailed climatic 
effects is conducted, it might not significantly influence decision-making. 
Indeed, the eia is a procedural requirement, and a finding of negative envi-
ronmental effects in itself will not necessarily halt a project. Thus, in deciding 
to block Heathrow Airport’s expansion, a UK court clarified that it did not rule 
on the compatibility of the project with the United Kingdom’s climatic obliga-
tions, but rather was giving the government ‘the opportunity to reconsider’125 
its planning policy in order to take account of climatic effects.
The next subsection explores the possibility of using the Paris Agreement’s 
reporting mechanisms to increase accountability for fossil-fuel development.
4.2 Fossil-Fuel Supply and the Paris Agreement
Mitigating climate change by way of international agreements has many 
challenges, including scientific uncertainties, political doubts, and tensions 
between promoting ambitious emission cuts and providing cost-effective solu-
tions for states.126
The lack of fossil-fuel production regulation in climate treaties conforms to 
a broader trend of states to come up short on political will to cede regulation of 
energy production to international law.127 The fact that emission-reduction targets 
are not universal gives rise to the problem of carbon leakage, whereby the extracted 
oil and gas would ‘find their way to a country where they can be converted into CO2 
without any constraint imposed by international and domestic law.’128
There is scope for introducing information on fossil-fuel supply in report-
ing and assessment under the Paris Agreement to facilitate transparency and 
124 Peel, supra note 118, at 17–18.
125 R (Friends of the Earth) v. Secretary of State for Transport and others [2020] ewca Civ 213, at 
paragraph 285.
126 See Ole Røgeberg, Steinar Andresen, and Bjart Holtsmark, ‘International Climate Treaties: 
The Case for Pessimism,’ 1 Climate Law 177 (2010).
127 In relation to climate, see Van Asselt, Merrill and Kulovesi, supra note 40, at 144. See also, 
Shapovalova, supra note 91. The international treaty establishing liability for oil spills from 
upstream activities is still not in force: Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (signed 1 May 
1977, not in force), despite the equivalent treaty for shipping having been in force since 1975: 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (signed 29 November 
1969, in force 19 June 1975) 973 UNTS 3.
128 Sidortsov, supra note 8, at 5.
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accountability. The Agreement establishes a system of reporting and transpar-
ency, including through ndcs and the Enhanced Transparency Framework, 
which provides for a reporting system, technical review, and the process 
known as Multilateral Consideration of Progress.129
The idea of including information on petroleum production in the ndcs 
has been discussed in the context of reform of fossil-fuel subsidies,130 as well as 
fossil-fuel supply more broadly.131 While the precise content of ndcs was not 
defined in the Agreement itself,132 the Conference of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement was mandated to take decisions on the information needed for 
inclusion in the ndcs, to ensure ‘clarity, transparency and understanding.’133 
Although ndc guidance applies to mitigation,134 it has been agreed that ndcs 
can voluntarily include other components, such as ‘adaptation, finance, tech-
nology, capacity-building, education, or loss-and-damage commitments.’135 
Adaptation plans are to include information on ‘economic diversification 
and sustainable management of natural resources.’136 Some states are already 
including references to fossil-fuel subsidies in their ndcs.137 As new ndcs are 
to be submitted in 2020138 and 2025, and are required to represent a progres-
sion in ambition, extending their scope to data on fossil-fuel supply would be 
instrumental in providing full information. Further guidance on ndcs is due 
to be considered in 2024, providing an opportunity to make the reporting of 
information on fossil-fuel supply a mandatory component.139
129 Paris Agreement, article 13.
130 Harro van Asselt and Kati Kulovesi, ‘Seizing the Opportunity: Tackling Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
under the UNFCCC,’ 17 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 
357 (2017), at 365–6; Van Asselt, Merrill, and Kulovesi, supra note 40.
131 Verkuijl et al., supra note 8; Piggot et al., supra note 8.
132 There are, however, requirements for ndcs to be progressive in relation to current ndcs and 
reflect states’ ‘highest possible ambition’: Paris Agreement articles 4(3) and 4(9).
133 Ibid., article 4(8). Decision 4/CMA Annex I, Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation 
Section of Decision 1/CP.2, 19 March 2019, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1.
134 Decision 4/CMA, ibid., at paragraph 8.
135 Doelle, supra note 15, at 11.
136 Paris Agreement, article 7(9)(e).
137 There are mostly countries with small levels of production/export. See, e.g., ‘indc in Burkina 
Faso’ (September 2015) at 38; ‘Ghana’s indc and Accompanying Explanatory Note’ (September 
2015), at 11; ‘India’s indc: Working Towards Climate Justice’ (October 2016), at 28, <www4.
unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx>. See also Anika Terton et al., Fiscal Instruments 
in INDCs: How Countries Are Looking to Fiscal Policies to Support INDC Implementation (IISD, 
2015), <www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/fiscal-instruments-indcs.pdf>.
138 As of 20 June 2020, only five states had submitted their second ndcs (Andorra, Marshall 
Islands, Moldova, Norway, and Suriname); none of them address fossil-fuel supply.
139 Decision 4/CMA, supra note 133, at paragraph 20.
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Another appropriate reporting instrument for fossil-fuel supply would be 
the Paris Agreement’s Biennial Transparency Reports (btrs), the first round 
of which is due for submission by the end of 2024.140 This would be in line 
with the purpose of the Agreement’s framework for the transparency of action 
and support, which is ‘to provide a clear understanding of climate change 
action in the light of the objective of the [unfccc].’141 The treaty’s Enhanced 
Transparency Framework is the main mechanism by which to hold states 
accountable for implementing their ndcs.142 A compulsory element of a btr 
is information on ‘actions, policies and measures that support the implemen-
tation and achievement of its NDC.’143
In this context, btrs could provide information on a state’s plans for fos-
sil-fuel production with reference to historical levels of production, compati-
bility of production, and further use of these resources with the global climate 
goals, and any governmental support provided for extraction activities. btrs 
could further discuss the necessity of extraction in the context of energy secu-
rity and national economy, e.g. whether the resources are extracted to satisfy 
domestic demand and avoid imports, or for export, and, if so, what the destina-
tion is of such resources.144 Finally, states could include the measures taken or 
planned for the managed decline in production, with a view to just transition 
for the national economy and sector workforce.
While such inclusion would still not require states to reduce supply, repu-
tational costs are important, and so is information that empowers domestic 
stakeholders to take further action.145 All of the Arctic States are parties to the 
Paris Agreement, although the United States has announced its withdrawal.146 
The future participation of the United States is dependent on the outcome 
140 Decision 18/CMA.1, Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework 
for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/PA/
CMA/2018/3/Add.2, at paragraph 3.
141 Paris Agreement, article 13(5).
142 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?,’ 110(2) American Journal 
of International Law 288 (2016), at 311. See also Benoit Mayer, ‘Transparency Under the Paris 
Rulebook: Is the Transparency Framework Truly Enhanced?,’ 9(1–2) Climate Law 40 (2019).
143 Decision 18/CMA.1, supra note 140, at paragraph 80.
144 This is in line with paragraph 106 of Decision 18/CMA.1, supra note 140.
145 Van Asselt, Merrill, and Kulovesi, supra note 40.
146 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (1 June 2017), <www.whitehouse.
gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/>. The formal 
notification was provided in November 2019 and will take effect in November 2020. 
Michael R. Pompeo, ‘On the U.S Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,’ <www.state.gov/
on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/>.
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of the 2020 election (which at the time of writing was unknown).147 Russia 
ratified the Agreement later than the majority of states, but is developing a 
climate change mitigation and adaptation framework.148 A requirement that 
fossil-fuel supply is to be included in the ndcs would be valuable, especially 
in the context of Russia, where public access to environmental information on 
the upstream sector is not guaranteed by national legislation.149
5 Conclusion
The climatic effects of oil-and-gas development in the Arctic are inconsistent 
with global climate goals.150 In the absence of universal and binding reduc-
tion targets, such a gap in the regulation limits the effectiveness of these trea-
ties, whereby developed and ‘committed’ states, including the Arctic States, 
although reducing their emissions, continue to produce oil and gas for con-
sumption elsewhere. The Paris Agreement approach replaces the top-down 
quantified targets with a framework for cooperative action, transparency, and 
accountability. The effectiveness of this approach is only possible with the pro-
vision of full information, not only on national emission levels but also on the 
planned and approved production of fossil fuels.
In this article, I examined the rationale for establishing procedural obli-
gations on authorizing new petroleum development in the Arctic with a ref-
erence to international law and domestic practices. While climate change 
treaties do not create direct obligations on fossil-fuel supply, the shift from top-
down obligations for selected states to the more universal framework based 
on enhanced reporting and transparency may provide an effective platform 
for consideration of the entailed climatic effects of fossil-fuel production. I 
also examined two ways of establishing accountability for fossil-fuel supply, 
with specific reference to the Arctic petroleum-producing states: inclusion of 
entailed climatic effects in both the eia process and the reporting processes 
under the Paris Agreement. While current state practice does not consistently 
147 The Democratic Party nominee Joe Biden has committed to re-joining the Paris Agreement; 
see <https://joebiden.com/climate/>.
148 Russia’s ratification came on 7 October 2019. In January 2020, the Russian Government 
adopted the ‘National Action Plan for the First Phase of Adaptation to Climate Change for 
the Period up to 2022,’ <http://government.ru/docs/38739/> (in Russian). See also Alena V. 
Kolodova and Alexander M. Solntsev, ‘Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle in Russian 
Legislation on Climate Change: Problems and Prospects,’ 10(2) Climate Law 197 (2020).
149 Koivurova and Lesser, supra note 96, at 194–5. For the relevant legislation, see supra note 101.
150 McGlade and Ekins, supra note 3.
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reflect these obligations, there is scope for industry initiative, civil-society 
pressure, and judicial intervention. There is also an emergent judicial interpre-
tation of the eia process as inclusive of entailed climatic effects of fossil-fuel 
projects. Despite the rapidly growing scholarly and political attention to fos-
sil-fuel-supply measures, the methodological and practical considerations for 
implementing them warrant further research.
Environmental law, especially as it relates to the regulation of extractive 
industries, has often been reactive rather than anticipatory. In the face of the 
dangerous risks of climate change, there is no room for hesitation, and the 
law needs to be progressive and aligned with the scientific findings and eco-
nomic analysis. There is an urgent need to address the entailed climatic effects 
of Arctic petroleum resources, alongside their potential benefits to the econo-
mies of the Arctic States.
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